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Abstract
With the emergence of data silos and popular
privacy awareness, the traditional centralized ap-
proach of training artificial intelligence (AI) mod-
els is facing strong challenges. Federated learning
(FL) has recently emerged as a promising solution
under this new reality. Existing FL protocol design
has been shown to exhibit vulnerabilities which can
be exploited by adversaries both within and without
the system to compromise data privacy. It is thus of
paramount importance to make FL system design-
ers to be aware of the implications of future FL al-
gorithm design on privacy-preservation. Currently,
there is no survey on this topic. In this paper, we
bridge this important gap in FL literature. By pro-
viding a concise introduction to the concept of FL,
and a unique taxonomy covering threat models and
two major attacks on FL: 1) poisoning attacks and
2) inference attacks, this paper provides an accessi-
ble review of this important topic. We highlight the
intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental
assumptions adopted by various attacks, and dis-
cuss promising future research directions towards
more robust privacy preservation in FL.
1 Introduction
As computing devices become increasingly ubiquitous, peo-
ple generate huge amounts of data through their day to day
usage. Collecting such data into centralized storage facilities
is costly and time consuming. Another important concern is
data privacy and user confidentiality as the usage data usually
contain sensitive information [Abadi et al., 2016]. Sensitive
data such as facial images, location-based services, or health
informatioon can be used for targeted social advertising and
recommendation, posing the immediate or potential privacy
risks. Hence, private data should not be directly shared
without any privacy consideration. As societies become in-
creasingly aware of privacy preservation, legal restrictions
such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are
emerging which makes data aggregation practices less feasi-
ble [Yang et al., 2019b].
Traditional centralized machine learning (ML) cannot sup-
port such ubiquitous deployments and applications due to
Table 1: Taxonomy for horizontal federated learning (HFL).
HFL Number of
Participants
FL Training
Participation
Technical Ca-
pability
H2B small frequent high
H2C large not frequent low
infrastructure shortcomings such as limited communication
bandwidth, intermittent network connectivity, and strict de-
lay constraints [Li et al., 2018]. In this scenario, federated
learning (FL) which pushes model training to the devices
from which data originate emerged as a promising alternative
ML paradigm [McMahan et al., 2016b]. FL enables a mul-
titude of participants to construct a joint ML model without
exposing their private training data [McMahan et al., 2016b;
Bonawitz et al., 2017]. It can handle unbalanced and non-
independent and identically distributed (non-IID) data which
naturally arise in the real world [McMahan et al., 2016a].
In recent years, FL has benefited a wide range of applica-
tions such as next word prediction [McMahan et al., 2016a;
McMahan et al., 2018], visual object detection for safety [Liu
et al., 2020], etc.
1.1 Types of Federated Learning
Based on the distribution of data features and data sam-
ples among participants, federated learning can be gener-
ally classified as horizontally federated learning (HFL), verti-
cally federated learning (VFL) and federated transfer learning
(FTL) [Yang et al., 2019a].
Under HFL, datasets owned by each participant share sim-
ilar features but concern different users [Kantarcioglu and
Clifton, 2004]. In this paper, we further classify HFL into
HFL to businesses (H2B), and HFL to consumers (H2C). A
comparison between H2B and H2C is listed in Table 1. The
main difference lies in the number of participants, FL train-
ing participation level, and technical capability, which can in-
fluence how adversaries attempt to compromise the FL sys-
tem. Under H2B, there are typically a handful of participants.
They can be frequently selected during FL training. The par-
ticipants tend to possess significant computational power and
sophisticated technical capabilities [Yang et al., 2019b]. Un-
der H2C, there can be thousands or even millions of potential
participants. In each round of training, only a subset of them
are selected. As their datasets tend to be small, the chance
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of a participant being selected repeatedly for FL training is
low. They generally possess limited computational power and
low technical capabilities. An example of H2C is Google’s
GBoard application [McMahan et al., 2018].
VFL is applicable to the cases in which participants have
large overlaps in the sample space but differ in the feature
space, i.e., different parties hold different attributes of the
same records [Vaidya and Clifton, 2002]. VFL mainly tar-
gets business participants. Thus, the characteristics of VFL
participants are similar to those of H2B participants.
FTL deals with scenarios in which FL participants have
little overlap in both the sample space and the feature
space [Yang et al., 2019b]. Currently, there is no published
research studying threats to FTL models.
1.2 Privacy Leakage in FL
FL offers a privacy-aware paradigm of model training which
does not require data sharing and allows participants to join
and leave a federation freely. Nevetheless, recent works have
demonstrated that FL may not always provide sufficient pri-
vacy guarantees, as communicating model updates through-
out the training process can nonetheless reveal sensitive in-
formation [Bhowmick et al., 2018; Fredrikson et al., 2015;
Melis et al., 2019] even incur deep leakage [Zhu et al., 2019],
either to a third-party, or to the central server [McMahan
et al., 2018; Agarwal et al., 2018]. For instance, as shown
by [Aono et al., 2018], even a small portion of original gradi-
ents may reveal information about local data. A more recent
work in NeurIPS 2019 showed that the malicious attacker can
completely steal the training data from gradients in a few it-
erations [Zhu et al., 2019].
FL protocol designs may contain vulnerabilities for both
(1) the (potentially malicious) server, who can observe indi-
vidual updates over time, tamper with the training process
and control the view of the participants on the global param-
eters; and (2) any participant who can observe the global pa-
rameter, and control its parameter uploads. For example, ma-
licious participants can deliberately alter their inputs or in-
troduce stealthy backdoors into the global model. Such at-
tacks pose significant threats to FL. Therefore, it is important
to understand the principles behind these attacks. Existing
survey papers on FL mostly focused on the broad aspect of
Party 1 Party 2 Party n
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1: send local model gradients
2: aggregate local model gradients
3: download the latest global model  
4: update local models 
Figure 1: A typical FL training process, in which both the (po-
tentially malicious) FL server/aggregator and malicious participants
may compromise the FL system.
how to make FL work [Yang et al., 2019a; Li et al., 2019;
Kairouz et al., 2019]. In this paper, we survey recent ad-
vances in threats to compromise FL to bridge this important
gap in the artificial intelligence (AI) research community’s
understanding in this topic. In particular, we focus on two
specific threats initiated by the insiders on FL systems: 1)
poisoning attacks that attempt to prevent a model from being
learned at all, or to bias the model to produce inferences that
are preferable to the adversary; and 2) inference attacks that
target participant privacy. The properties of these attacks are
summarized in Table 2.
2 Threat Models
Before reviewing attacks on FL, we first present a summary
of the threat models.
2.1 Insider v.s. Outsider
Attacks can be carried out by insiders and outsiders. Insider
attacks include those launched by the FL server and the par-
ticipants in the FL system. Outsider attacks include those
launched by the eavesdroppers on the communication chan-
nel between participants and the FL server, and by users of
the final FL model when it is deployed as a service.
Insider attacks are generally stronger than the outsider at-
tacks, as it strictly enhances the capability of the adver-
sary. Due to this stronger behavior, our discussion of attacks
against FL will focus primarily on the insider attacks, which
can take one of the following three general forms:
1. Single attack: a single, non-colluding malicious par-
ticipant aims to cause the model to miss-classify a set
of chosen inputs with high confidence [Bhagoji et al.,
2018; Bagdasaryan et al., 2018];
2. Byzantine attack: the byzantine malicious participants
may behave completely arbitrarily and tailor their out-
puts to have similar distribution as the correct model
updates, making them difficult to detect [Blanchard
et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018;
Yin et al., 2018];
3. Sybil attack: the adversaries can simulate multiple
dummy participant accounts or select previously com-
promised participants to mount more powerful attacks
on FL [Fung et al., 2018; Bagdasaryan et al., 2018].
2.2 Semi-honest v.s. Malicious
Under the semi-honest setting, adversaries are considered
passive or honest-but-curious. They try to learn the private
states of other parties without deviating from the FL proto-
col. The passive adversaries are assumed to only observe the
aggregated or averaged gradient, but not the training data or
gradient of other honest participants. Under the malicious
setting, an active, or malicious adversary tries to learn the
private states of honest participants, and deviates arbitrarily
from the FL protocol by modifying, re-playing, or removing
messages. This strong adversary model allows the adversary
to conduct particularly devastating attacks.
Table 2: A summary of attacks against server-based FL.
Attack Type
Attack Targets Attacker Role FL Scenario Attack Complexity
Model Training Data Participant Server H2B H2C Attack Iteration Auxiliary Knowledge Required
One round Multiple rounds
Data Poisoning YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
Model Poisoning YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
Infer Class Representatives NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES
Infer Membership NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES
Infer Properties NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES
Infer Training Inputs and Labels NO YES NO YES YES NO NO YES NO
2.3 Training Phase v.s. Inference Phase
Attacks at training phase attempt to learn, influence, or cor-
rupt the FL model itself [Biggio et al., 2011]. During training
phase, the attacker can run data poisoning attacks to com-
promise the integrity of training dataset collection, or model
poisoning attacks to compromise the integrity of the learning
process. The attacker can also launch a range of inference at-
tacks on an individual participant’s update or on the aggregate
of updates from all participants.
Attacks at inference phase are called evasion/exploratory
attacks [Barreno et al., 2006]. They generally do not tamper
with the targeted model, but instead, either cause it to produce
wrong outputs (targeted/untargeted) or collect evidence about
the model characteristics. The effectiveness of such attacks is
largely determined by the information that is available to the
adversary about the model. Inference phase attacks can be
classified into white-box attacks (i.e. with full access to the
FL model) and black-box attacks (i.e. only able to query the
FL model). In FL, the model maintained by the server not
only suffers from the same evasion attacks as in the general
ML setting when the target model is deployed as a service,
the model broadcast step in FL renders the model accessible
to any malicious client. Thus, FL requires extra efforts to
defend against white-box evasion attacks. In this survey, we
omit the discussion of inference phase attacks, and mainly
focus on the training phase attacks.
3 Poisoning Attacks
Depending on the attacker’s objective, poisoning attacks can
be either a) random attacks and b) targeted attacks [Huang
et al., 2011]. Random attacks aim to reduce the accuracy of
the FL model, whereas targeted attacks aim to induce the FL
model to output the target label specified by the adversary.
Generally, targeted attacks is more difficult than random at-
tacks as the attacker has a specific goal to achieve. Poisoning
attacks during the training phase can be performed on the data
or on the model. Figure 2 shows that the poisoned updates can
be sourced from two poisoning attacks: (1) data poisoning at-
tack during local data collection; and (2) model poisoning at-
tack during local model training process. At a high level, both
poisoning attacks attempt to modify the behavior of the target
model in some undesirable way. If adversaries can compro-
mise the FL server, then they can easily perform both targeted
and untargeted poisoning attacks on the trained model.
3.1 Data Poisoning
Data poisoning attacks largely fall in two categories: 1) clean-
label [Shafahi et al., 2018] and 2) dirty-label [Gu et al., 2017].
Local data
collection
Local model
training process
Data Poisoning Model Poisoning Poisoned model parameter
∆w1
Central server
Local data
collection
Local model
training process
∆wn
w’=w+aggregate(∆w1+⋯+∆wn)
Figure 2: Data v.s. model poisoning attacks in FL.
Clean-label attacks assume that the adversary cannot change
the label of any training data as there is a process by which
data are certified as belonging to the correct class and the poi-
soning of data samples has to be imperceptible. In contrast,
in dirty-label poisoning, the adversary can introduce a num-
ber of data sample it wishes to miss-classify with the desired
target label into the training set.
One common example of dirty-label poisoning attack is the
label-flipping attack [Biggio et al., 2012; Fung et al., 2018].
The labels of honest training examples of one class are flipped
to another class while the features of the data are kept un-
changed. For example, the malicious clients in the system
can poison their dataset by flipping all 1s into 7s. A success-
ful attack produces a model that is unable to correctly clas-
sify 1s and incorrectly predicts them to be 7s. Another weak
but realistic attack scenario is backdoor poisoning [Gu et al.,
2017]. Here, an adversary can modify individual features or
small regions of the original training dataset to embed back-
doors into the model, so that the model behaves according to
the adversary’s objective if the input contains the backdoor
features (e.g., a stamp on an image). However, the perfor-
mance of the poisoned model on clean inputs is not affected.
In this way, the attacks are harder to be detected.
Data poisoning attacks can be carried out by any FL par-
ticipant. The impact on the FL model depends on the extent
to which participants in the system engage in the attacks, and
the amount of training data being poisoned. Data poisoning
is less effective in settings with fewer participants like H2C.
3.2 Model Poisoning
Model poisoning attacks aim to poison local model updates
before sending them to the server or insert hidden backdoors
into the global model [Bagdasaryan et al., 2018].
In targeted model poisoning, the adversary’s objective is
to cause the FL model to miss-classify a set of chosen inputs
with high confidence. Note that these inputs are not modified
to induce miss-classification at test time as under adversar-
Example: users' identities
model updates leak info 
about training data
Predict gender
Not correlated to 
learning task
Figure 3: Attacker infers information unrelated to the learning task.
ial example attacks [Szegedy et al., 2013]. Rather, the miss-
classification is a result of adversarial manipulations of the
training process. Recent works have investigated poisoning
attacks on model updates in which a subset of updates sent
to the server at any given iteration are poisoned [Blanchard
et al., 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2018]. These poisoned updates
can be generated by inserting hidden backdoors, and even a
single-shot attack may be enough to introduce a backdoor into
a model [Bagdasaryan et al., 2018].
Bhagoji et al. [2018] demonstrated that model poisoning
attacks are much more effective than data poisoning in FL set-
tings by analyzing a targeted model poisoning attack, where a
single, non-colluding malicious participant aims to cause the
model to miss-classify a set of chosen inputs with high con-
fidence. To increase attack stealth and evade detection, they
use the alternating minimization strategy to alternately op-
timize for the training loss and the adversarial objective, and
use parameter estimation for the benign participants’ updates.
This adversarial model poisoning attack can cause targeted
poisoning of the FL model undetected.
In fact, model poisoning subsumes data poisoning in FL
settings, as data poisoning attacks eventually change a sub-
set of updates sent to the model at any given iteration [Fung
et al., 2018]. This is functionally identical to a centralized
poisoning attack in which a subset of the whole training data
is poisoned. Model poisoning attacks require sophisticated
technical capabilities and high computational resources. Such
attacks are generally less suitable for H2C scenarios, but more
likely to happen in H2B scenarios.
4 Inference Attacks
Exchanging gradients during FL training can result in seri-
ous privacy leakage [Phong et al., 2018; Su and Xu, 2018;
Melis et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2019]. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 3, model updates can leak extra information about the
unintended features about participants’ training data to the
adversarial participants, as deep learning models appear to
internally recognize many features of the data that are not ap-
parently related with the main tasks. The adversary can also
save the snapshot of the FL model parameters, and conduct
property inference by exploiting the difference between the
consecutive snapshots, which is equal to the aggregated up-
dates from all participants less the adversary (Figure 4).
The main reason is that the gradients are derived from the
participants’ private data. In deep learning models, gradi-
ents of a given layer are computed using this layer’s features
and the error from the layer above. In the case of sequential
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Figure 4: Attacker infers gradients from a batch of training data.
fully connected layers, the gradients of the weights are the
inner products of the error from the layer above and the fea-
tures. Similarly, for a convolutional layer, the gradients of the
weights are convolutions of the error from the layer above and
the features [Melis et al., 2019]. Consequently, observations
of model updates can be used to infer a significant amount
of private information, such as class representatives, mem-
bership as well as properties associated with a subset of the
training data. Even worse, an attacker can infer labels from
the shared gradients and recover the original training sam-
ples without requiring any prior knowledge about the training
set [Zhu et al., 2019].
4.1 Inferring Class Representatives
Hitaj et al. [2017] devised an active inference attack called
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) attack on deep FL
models. Here, a malicious participant can intentionally com-
promise any other participant. The GAN attack exploits the
real-time nature of the FL learning process that allows the
adversarial party to train a GAN that generates prototypical
samples of the targeted training data which were meant to
be private. The generated samples appear to come from the
same distribution as the training data. Hence, GAN attack is
not targeted at reconstructing actual training inputs, but only
class representatives. It should be noted that GAN attack as-
sumes that the entire training corpus for a given class comes
from a single participant, and only in the special case where
all class members are similar, GAN-constructed representa-
tives are similar to the training data. This resembles model
inversion attacks in the general ML settings [Fredrikson et
al., 2015]. However, these assumptions may be less practical
in FL. Moreover, GAN attack is less suitable for H2C scenar-
ios, as it requires large computation resources.
4.2 Inferring Membership
Given an exact data point, membership inference attacks aim
to determine if it was used to train the model [Shokri et al.,
2017]. For example, an attacker can infer whether a specific
patient profile was used to train a classifier associated with a
disease. FL presents interesting new avenues for such attacks.
In FL, the adversary’s objective is to infer if a particular sam-
ple belongs to the private training data of a single party (if
target update is of a single party) or of any party (if target
update is the aggregate). For example, the non-zero gradients
of the embedding layer of a deep learning model trained on
natural-language text reveal which words appear in the train-
ing batches used by the honest participants during FL model
training. This enables an adversary to infer whether a given
text appeared in the training dataset [Melis et al., 2019].
Attackers in an FL system can conduct both active and
passive membership inference attacks [Nasr et al., 2019;
Melis et al., 2019]. In the passive case, the attacker simply
observes the updated model parameters and performs infer-
ence without changing anything in the local or global col-
laborative training procedure. In the active case, however,
the attacker can tamper with the FL model training proto-
col and perform a more powerful attack against other partici-
pants. Specifically, the attacker shares malicious updates and
forces the FL model to share more information about the par-
ticipants’ local data the attacker is interested in. This attack,
called gradient ascent attack [Nasr et al., 2019], exploits the
fact that SGD optimization updates model parameters in the
opposite direction of the gradient of the loss.
4.3 Inferring Properties
An adversary can launch both passive and active property in-
ference attacks to infer properties of other participants’ train-
ing data that are independent of the features that characterize
the classes of the FL model [Melis et al., 2019]. Property in-
ference attacks assume that the adversary has auxiliary train-
ing data correctly labelled with the property he wants to infer.
An passive adversary can only observe/eavesdrop the updates
and perform inference by training a binary property classi-
fier. An active adversary can use multi-task learning to trick
the FL model into learning a better separation for data with
and without the property, and thus extract more information.
An adversarial participant can even infer when a property ap-
pears and disappears in the data during training (e.g., identi-
fying when a person first appears in the photos used to train
a gender classifier). The assumption in property inference at-
tacks may prevent its applicability in H2C.
4.4 Inferring Training Inputs and Labels
The most recent work called Deep Leakage from Gradient
(DLG) proposed an optimization algorithm that can obtain
both the training inputs and the labels in just a few itera-
tions [Zhu et al., 2019]. This attack is much stronger than
previous approaches. It can recover pixel-wise accurate orig-
inal images and token-wise matching original texts. [Zhao et
al., 2020] presented an analytical approach called Improved
Deep Leakage from Gradient (iDLG), which can certainly ex-
tract labels from the shared gradients by exploiting the rela-
tionship between the labels and the signs of corresponding
gradients. iDLG is valid for any differentiable model trained
with cross-entropy loss over one-hot labels, which is the gen-
eral case for classification.
Inference attacks generally assume that the adversaries
possess sophisticated technical capabilities and large compu-
tational resources. In addition, adversaries must be selected
for many rounds of FL training. Thus, it is not suitable for
H2C scenarios, but more likely under H2B scenarios. Such
attacks also highlight the need for protecting the gradients be-
ing shared during FL training, possibly through mechanisms
such as homomorphic encryption [Yang et al., 2019b].
5 Discussions and Promising Directions
There are still potential vulnerabilities which need to be ad-
dressed in order to improve the robustness of FL systems. In
this section, we outline research directions which we believe
are promising.
Curse of Dimensionality: Large models, with high di-
mensional parameter vectors, are particularly susceptible to
privacy and security attacks [Chang et al., 2019]. Most FL al-
gorithms require overwriting the local model parameters with
the global model. This makes them susceptible to poisoning
and backdoor attacks, as the adversary can make small but
damaging changes in the high-dimensional models without
being detected. Thus, sharing model parameters may not be a
strong design choice in FL, it opens all the internal state of the
model to inference attacks, and maximize the model’s mal-
leability by poisoning attacks. To address these fundamental
shortcomings of FL, it is worthwhile to explore whether shar-
ing model updates is essential. Instead, sharing less sensitive
information (e.g., SIGNSGD [Bernstein et al., 2018]) or only
sharing model predictions [Chang et al., 2019] in a black-box
manner may result in more robust privacy protection in FL.
Threats to VFL: In VFL, there may only be one party who
owns labels for the given learning task. It is unclear if all the
participants have equal capability of attacking the FL model,
and if threats to HFL can work on VFL. Most of the current
threats still focus on HFL. Thus, threats on VFL, which is
important to businesses, are worth exploring.
FL with Heterogeneous Architectures: Sharing model
updates is typically limited only to homogeneous FL archi-
tectures, i.e., the same model is shared with all participants.
It would be interesting to study how to extend FL to collab-
oratively train models with heterogeneous architectures [Gao
et al., 2019; Chang et al., 2019], and whether existing attacks
and privacy techniques can be adapted to this paradigm.
Decentralized Federated Learning: Decentralized FL
where no single server is required in the system is currently
being studied [Yang et al., 2019b; Lyu et al., 2019]. This is
a potential learning framework for collaboration among busi-
nesses which do not trust any third party. In this paradigm,
each party could be elected as a server in a round robin man-
ner. It would be interesting to investigate if existing threats
on server-based FL still apply in this scenario. Moreover, it
may open new attack surfaces. One possible example is that
the last party who was elected as the server is more likely
to effectively contaminate the whole model if it chooses to
insert backdoors. This resembles the fact in server-based
FL models which are more vulnerable to backdoors in later
rounds of training nearing convergence. Similarly, if decen-
tralized training is conducted in a “ring all reduce” manner,
then any malicious participant can steal the training data from
its neighbors.
Weakness of Current Defense: FL with secure aggrega-
tion are especially susceptible to poisoning attacks as the in-
dividual updates cannot be inspected. It is still unclear if ad-
versarial training can be adapted to FL, as adversarial training
was developed primarily for IID data, and it is still a challeng-
ing problem how it performs in non-IID settings. Moreover,
adversarial training typically requires many epochs, which
may be impractical in H2C. Another possible defense is based
on differential privacy (DP). Record-level DP bounds the suc-
cess of membership inference, but does not prevent property
inference applied to a group of training records [Melis et al.,
2019]. Participant-level DP, on the other hand, is geared to
work with thousands of users for training to converge and
achieving an acceptable trade-off between privacy and accu-
racy [McMahan et al., 2018]. The FL model fails to converge
with a small number of participants, making it unsuitable for
H2B scenarios. Furthermore, DP may hurt the accuracy of the
learned model, which is not appealing to the industry. Further
work is needed to investigate if participant-level DP can pro-
tect FL systems with few participants.
Optimizing DefenseMechanism Deployment: When de-
ploying defense mechanisms to check if any adversary is at-
tacking the FL system, the FL server will need to incur ex-
tra computational cost. In addition, different defense mech-
anisms may have different effectiveness against various at-
tacks, and incur different cost. It is important to study how
to optimize the timing of deploying defense mechanisms or
the anouncement of deterrence measures. Game theoretic re-
search holds promise in addressing this challenge.
Federated learning is still in its infancy and will continue
to be an active and important research area for the foresee-
able future. As FL evolves, so will the attack mechanisms.
It is of vital importance to provide a broad overview of cur-
rent attacks on FL so that future FL system designers are
aware of the potential vulnerabilities in their designs. This
survey serves as a concise and accessible overview of this
topic, and it would greatly help our understanding of the
threat landscape in FL. Global collaboration on FL is emerg-
ing through a number of workshops in leading AI confer-
ences1. The ultimate goal of developing a general purpose
defense mechanism robust against various attacks without de-
grading model performance will require interdisciplinary ef-
fort from the wider research community.
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